Moral Hazard Assessment in State-subsidized Renewable Energy Investments by Hortay, Olivér
Cite this article as: Hortay, O. (2019) "Moral Hazard Assessment in State-subsidized Renewable Energy Investments", Periodica Polytechnica Social and 
Management Sciences 27(1), pp. 37–47, https://doi.org/10.3311/PPso.12360
https://doi.org/10.3311/PPso.12360
Creative Commons Attribution b |37
Periodica Polytechnica Social and Management Sciences, 27(1), pp. 37–47, 2019
Moral Hazard Assessment in State-subsidized  
Renewable Energy Investments
Olivér Hortay1*
1 Department of Environmental Economics, Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences, Budapest University of Technology and 
Economics, H-1521 Budapest, P.O.B. 91, Hungary
* Corresponding author, e-mail: hortay@eik.bme.hu
Received: 06 April 2018, Accepted: 30 August 2018, Published online: 28 January 2019
Abstract
This paper presents the impact of state subsidy programs on moral hazard in renewable energy investments. The purpose of the 
research is to build a theoretical model which is able to handle the borrower’s behavior under asymmetric information circumstances, 
thus creating a new aspect in the debate about the choice of the financially ideal incentive structure. The general conclusion of the 
article is that technology based subsidy mechanisms which provide great protection to the investing companies (ceteris paribus), 
increase information asymmetry and agency costs. While these systems improve predictability of revenues, they block effective 
lending or otherwise, the market dependent subsidies moderate the moral hazard, which reduce the risk of fluctuating market prices.
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1 Introduction
In the last decades, the member states of the European 
Union (EU) have devoted – in a different system and logic 
– a lot of resources to the spread of renewable energy 
sources (RES). The idea behind state subsidies is that 
RES-based electricity (RES-E) production has social and 
environmental benefits, which are not reflected in market 
prices and that the internalization of such effects requires 
market intervention. This activity has been reinforced by 
the widely accepted expectation that the EU can benefit 
from the experiences and emerging good practices it gains 
by firstly moving in the direction of renewables, through 
artificially increasing their share in the energy mix and 
ultimately achieving a global advantage (Verbruggen and 
Lauber, 2012). The European Parliament and the Council 
have also quickly recognized the need for coordinated 
action by the Member States to achieve these changes 
and have therefore issued a special directive on the prop-
agation of renewable energies (European Parliament and 
Council, 2001). The European countries have relatively 
freely shaped their incentives thus different types of 
schemes have evolved (Ackerman et al., 2001).
Price subsidies can be divided into two main cate-
gories: feed-in tariff (FIT) and feed-in premium (FIP). 
In the FIT systems, producers sell electricity at regulated, 
constant (partly inflation-corrected) price, to a balancing 
group designated by the authority. The balancing group 
sells energy on the market and receives compensation for 
its loss. In the FIP systems, the producers sell electricity 
on the market and receive a premium over the sales price. 
Based on the logic of the premium calculation, FIP sys-
tems can be classified into other categories. Among them, 
this study analyses the fixed premium, the floating pre-
mium and multiplier premium subsidies. 
However, as pointed out by most experts, mostly feed-in 
tariff systems were deployed, which is considered to be 
the most effective (Butler and Neuhoff, 2008; Fouquet and 
Johansson, 2008; International Energy Agency, 2008; Klein 
et al., 2008; Lipp, 2007; Mendonça, 2007; Stern, 2006) 
in order to increase the market share of renewable tech-
nologies. Apart from the internalization of external costs, 
the achievement of renewable capacity objectives for each 
priority year has also appeared as an additional motiva-
tion (European Parliament and Council, 2009).
While subsidy systems had contributed significantly to 
the growth of RES capacities (Nicolini and Tavoni, 2017), 
in 2014, the European Commission issued a new guide-
line that approached RES-E incentives from a new per-
spective (European Commission, 2014). The document 
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emphasized the importance of developing financial incen-
tives (Dinica, 2006; Verbruggen and Lauber, 2012) and 
they responded to recent trends, such as the drastically 
decreasing cost of RES-E production and emergence of 
new technologies (Dinica, 2011). The main lesson was that 
there is no longer a need for a strong market defense for 
RES producers at the expense of other players because 
it seriously distorts the market and reduces competitive-
ness. RES technologies need to be launched on the mar-
ket to compete in the near future with traditional produc-
ers (Giacomarra and Bono, 2015; Huntington et al., 2017). 
According to the new guideline, from January 1, 2017, 
the FIT system should be replaced by a feed-in pre-
mium structure (except for low installed capacity and 
demonstration projects), which can be allocated by the 
Member States after a tendering procedure (European 
Commission, 2014). Therefore, the effects of the conver-
sion that the incentives brought about can be expected 
to be twofold: on the one hand, the greater integration 
of RES producers (Boscan and Poudineh, 2016; Klein et 
al., 2008; Lipp, 2007) and, on the other hand, the increase 
of investor risks (Mendonça, 2007). Consequently, under 
the new support environment, financing conditions will 
change and unless the tenders will result in higher prices 
than the previous FIT, – according to simple business 
logic – higher risks will be associated with lower expected 
returns. In addition to that, with decreasing predictability, 
an another factor appears: by providing less public pro-
tection to RES operators, a selection mechanism may be 
launched in which those will survive who find better solu-
tions for RES-E sales. Moreover, what the most important 
is in the context of this paper that sales performances pro-
vides additional signals to financiers, reducing the infor-
mation gap between the two stakeholders. To help deci-
sion-makers predict how market players will respond to 
the introduced support system, it is necessary to under-
stand the motivations of these participants.
Many empirical results show that the capital market is 
not cleared through interest rate adjustment and the capital 
allocation between investments does not reach the social 
optimum (Baker et al., 1988; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; 
Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2000; Hall and Liebman, 1998). 
One of the main equilibrium explanations of this phenom-
enon is that the reason for distortion is the systematic pres-
ence of information asymmetry between investors and 
entrepreneurs (Mankiw, 2004), with particular regard to 
its two types: adverse selection and moral hazard. There is 
no consensus in the literature regarding the impact of state 
subsidies on the appearance of the two factors: while some 
authors suggest that subsidies may partly be a solution for 
the adverse selection problem (Kleer, 2010; Takalo and 
Tanayama, 2010), others have come to the conclusion that 
state interventions present unrealistic incentives to firms 
(Chaney and Thakor, 1985; Hirsch, 2006; Keuschnigg and 
Nielsen, 2001; Schertler, 2000; 2002a; 2002b). In the past, 
many authors have generalized the moral hazard between 
private participants in corporate financial models (Csóka et 
al., 2015; Grossman and Hart, 1983; Hart and Moore, 1998; 
Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Laffont and Tirole, 1988; 
Sappington, 1983; Shavell, 1979; Tirole, 2006), but – as 
benefits of subsidies are mostly generated at the social 
level – it is also worthwhile to take into account the public 
impacts (Berlinger et al., 2017).
This article presents borrower's and lender's behavior 
in a contract theory approach to each RES-E subsidy sys-
tem, so to say how state interventions affect the informa-
tion asymmetry between the two participants and thus the 
social benefit of the project. The main result of the research 
is that all subsidies increase the social benefits and the 
payment of the entrepreneur and the investor as well, but 
each system to a different extent: the information asym-
metry decreases in the more moderate state protection sys-
tems and thus the social benefits of the project increases.
Section 2 presents the benchmark model for the com-
parison method, Section 3 discusses separately how each 
subsidy system modifies the basic model, Section 4 sum-
marizes the results and finally Section 5 presents the con-
clusions and their policy implications.
2 Benchmark model1 
The benchmark model can be basically given as a combi-
nation of two previously published papers. Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1997) have built a scalable, constant rate of return 
model for two participants (entrepreneur and investor), in 
which initial investment I is needed to realize the project 
(I > 0), but the entrepreneur has only initial asset A (where 
I > A > 0), so there is a need for an investor to finance 
the remaining (F = I − A) amount. The main problem is 
that during the operation, the entrepreneur will have more 
information about the company than the investor and 
therefore it will be harder to judge the correlation of suc-
cess or failures and the effort on the entrepreneur's side, as 
well as other external effects of the market. For illustrating 
1 The benchmark model based on Berlinger et al. (2017) nonrefundable 
ex-ante subsidy model.
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the phenomenon: the efficiency of a biomass power plant 
is influenced high extend by the price and quality of the 
knuckled wood. Generally, biomass is not economically 
remotely transported, so fuel is purchased from local 
sources. In addition, the quality of knuckled wood is influ-
enced by a number of factors, and their continuous moni-
toring requires a huge effort from the entrepreneur. But it 
is not always possible to check directly whether high fuel 
costs (or low fuel quality) are due to the fact that prices 
are actually high or the entrepreneur has not exerted suf-
ficient effort to conduct less expensive purchases. Such a 
risk may be affected by state intervention, so the model 
needs to be expanded with the subsidy S and the exter-
nalities generated E by the investment (Greenwald and 
Stiglitz, 1986). Berlinger et al. (2017) expands the previ-
ous model with a third (state) participant and takes into 
account external influences, hence maximizing social as 
well as corporate benefits.
2.1 Assumptions
The project consists of a single period: in t = 0 the invest-
ment is realized, and in t = 1 the participants share the profit. 
There are two possible outcomes of the model: success 
with probability p and failure with probability 1 − p (where 
0 ≤ p ≤ 1). As the entrepreneur's behavior influences the suc-
cess of the project (and the investor cannot directly observe 
it), probabilities can be shaped in two ways: when the entre-
preneur makes a high effort, the probability p = pH or when 
the entrepreneur makes a low effort, the probability p = pL 
(where pH > pL). There are three types of benefits in the proj-
ect and all three depend on the size of the investment:
• The positive externality E (for example emission 
reduction, job creation or other external benefits 
from RES-E investment) justifies the state sub-
sidy (E varies proportionally with the size of I, and 
EI > 0). This is independent of the financial success 
of the project, so it appears with the realization of the 
investment, and it increases social welfare.
• The RI is the return of the investment (where R > 1). 
RI will only be realized if the project is successful 
(with probability p). The RI is shared between the 
entrepreneur and the investor: RI = Re + Ri, where 
Re is the entrepreneur's and Ri is the investor's return 
(in case of failure, the entrepreneur and the investor 
do not get paid).
• The entrepreneur's private benefit B arises (and also 
varies with the size of I) if he or she makes a low 
effort (BI > 0).
In order for the model to focus solely on moral hazard, 
it assumes risk neutrality for all participants, so decisions 
are only influenced by the expected values. Assume that the 
time value of money is zero consequently, there is no need to 
discount between periods. The market for investors is per-
fectly competitive, so their expected returns are zero, hence 
all amount above zero net present value will be realized on 
the entrepreneur's end. Participants have limited liability, 
thus they can only lose as much money as they have invested.
The third participant is the state, which, in order to 
compensate for the externalities realized by the project, 
supports the investment by amount S. The subsidy con-
tract is concluded between the state and the entrepreneur 
before agreeing with the investor. The timing of the proj-
ect is shown in Fig. 1.
Based on these parameters, the social welfare (W) 
can be written as the sum of private and public utilities 
(net present values). The objective is to maximize social 
welfare:
max max .W p RI EI IH= + −  (1)
The problem will be relevant if the agent's low effort can 
cause a loss to somebody. The relevance of the moral  haz-
ard assumption can be described as Eq. (2):
p RI EI I p RI EI BI IH L+ − > > + + −0 .  (2)
Finally, in the case of renewable power plant projects, 
we have the following specific assumptions: 
• The entrepreneur can influence its operating costs 
and sales prices through its behavior so – keeping 
the previous example – if the management of a bio-
mass power plant exerts high efforts, it can reduce 
its expenditures (more efficient fuel procurement, 
well allocated resources etc.) and increase its reve-
nue (selling its electricity at a higher price).
• In case of failure (with probability 1 − p), the power 
plant will be built and operated during the period 
(the grant will be disbursed as described below and 
the external effects will also be realized), however, 
revenues and costs do not allow the entrepreneur and 
the investor to earn money (Re = Ri = 0).
Fig. 1 The timing of the project. Source: Berlinger et al. (2017)
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• The examined period is the same as the duration 
time of the subsidy and the lifetime of the power 
plant, i.e. at t = 0 the investment is realized and at 
t = 1 the profits generated during the lifetime of the 
power plant are distributed among participants.
• The state is able to forecast and price the external-
ities associated with the project, based on which it 
determines the level of the subsidy.
2.2 Methodology
The problem focuses on the selection of the right type of 
contract: the players have to decide in order to reach the 
social optimum. The contract design basically addresses 
three questions: what is the optimal size of I, the opti-
mal size of S and how much are the entrepreneur's and 
the investor's payments (Re, Ri). This can be achieved by 
optimizing the decision parameters (F, I, Re, Ri), while 
taking into account the exogenous parameters (R, B, A, 
pH, pL). According to the assumption that the entrepreneur 
maximizes its own profit and there is perfect competition 
among investors, previous equations give the objective 
function of the optimization problem of the entrepreneur 
(Obje) as Eq. (3):
Obje: max( ).p RI p R AH H i− −  (3)
A possible set of solutions to the problem is restricted 
by additional conditions. The financier will be interested 
in concluding a contract that motivates the entrepreneur 
to exert high effort, identifying the incentive constraint of 
the entrepreneur (ICe):
ICe: 
p R p R BI
R BI p p
H e L e
e H L
≥ +
≥ −/ ( ).
 (4)
The investor will only capitalize on the project if the 
expected value of the payment is greater than the capital. 
This can be used to prescribe the participation constraint 
of the investor (PCi):
PCi: p R FH i ≥ .  (5)
Finally, the budget constraints (BC) must be taken into 
account, which will appear in t = 0 (BC0), and in t = 1 (BC1):
BC0: A F S I
RI R Re i
+ + − ≥
− − ≥
0
0.
 (6)
BC1:  
The optimization problem can be solved by the Kuhn-
Tucker method, for which the Lagrange equation can be 
written, which will obviously have one solution (the lamb-
das are positive and the constraints are binding):
 = − − − − −
− − − − − − −
p RI p R A BI p p R
F p R I A F S
H H i H L e
H i
λ
λ λ λ
1
2 3 4
( )
( ) ( ) (
/ ( )
R R RIe i+ − ).
 (7)
The level of subsidy will be determined by the state as a 
solution to an optimization problem whose goal is to max-
imize social welfare ergo the objective function is Eq. (1). 
It is easy to see that the state will only support the project 
if the externalities exceed the subsidy, thus this will be the 
only participation constraint of the state (PCS):
PCS: EI S− ≥ 0.  (8)
2.3 Results of the benchmark model
After solving the two multivariate optimization problems, 
the decision parameters can be deduced by simple alge-
braic transformations, which are as follows:
• the optimum size of the investment is:
I A E= − −/ ( ),1
0
ρ  (9)
where p0 is the maximum income pledged by the entre-
preneur without the moral hazard being incurred:
ρ
0
= − −R B p pH L/ ( ),  (10)
• the level of state subsidy is:
S AE E= − −/ ( ),1
0
ρ  (11)
• the expected share of entrepreneur is:
R A S p R pe H H= + − −(( )( )) / ( ( )),ρ ρ0 01  (12)
• the expected share of investor is:
R A S pi H= + −( ( )) / ( ( ))ρ ρ0 01  (13)
• and the social welfare is:
W A p R E EH= + − − −( ( )) / ( ).1 1 0ρ  (14)
According to Berlinger et al. (2017), the benchmark model 
allows us to consider state subsidies in analyzing informa-
tion asymmetry. The model therefore shows that nonre-
fundable subsidies reduce moral hazard and have a positive 
impact both on project size and on social welfare. Based on 
these, it may be worth to the state to support RES-E invest-
ments, but as the types of renewable subsidies differ from 
the classic nonrefundable investment subsidies, it is useful 
to implement the benchmark model for each type of subsidy.
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3 Contract design in the subsidy systems
This section provides a separate description of the opti-
mization tasks that can be written for different types of 
RES-E subsidy systems for moral hazard. 
3.1 Optimal contract design in FIT system
The essence of the FIT systems is that the recipient gets 
the generated electricity from a producer within a fixed 
time interval at a fixed price. The tariff is determined by 
the regulator, taking into account production costs and 
optionally differentiating the prices according to technol-
ogy, size, type of energy or geographic location (Fouquet 
and Johansson, 2008; Klein et al., 2008; Mendonça, 2007). 
During the subsidy period, the FIT can be fixed (constant 
during the subsidy period), inflation following (the price 
of the subscription is continuously or periodically infla-
tionary during the subsidy period) or front-end loaded 
(two or more fixed tariffs at different levels in the period 
divisible) (Couture and Gagnon, 2010). However, the cate-
gories of the FIT system do not need to be modelled sepa-
rately because participants are risk-neutral, so this article 
discusses the simplest, fixed FIT system, in which, pay-
ments are constant over the period (Fig. 2).
In the FIT system, the power plant does not have a 
sales risk because the total revenue is provided by the 
state (SI) (Lipp, 2007). The level of state aid will be deter-
mined by two things: the externalities of the project (EI) 
and the expected selling price of the received electric-
ity (MI). In this case, there is no information asymmetry 
on the revenue side, the investor knows in advance what 
the production capacity of the power plant is and how 
much the selling price will be. In the case of operating 
expenditures, the agency costs appear because the effort 
of the entrepreneur cannot be predicted and controlled 
perfectly. The expected operational expenditure incurred 
during the project is indicated by CI, which is to be cor-
rected by dH if the entrepreneur makes high effort (with 
probability pH), and by dL if not (with probability pL), where 
dH < 1 < dL, not observable parameters. The income gen-
erated by the project is shared by the entrepreneur and the 
investor (SI − dHCI = Re + Ri ). The relevance of the moral 
hazard assumption is modified:
MI EI d CI I MI EI d CI BI I
M E d C M E d C B
H L
H L
+ − − > > + − + −
+ − > > + − +
0
1 .
 (15)
In determining the extent of the subsidy, the state takes 
into account, in addition to the external effects, how 
much revenue it will be able to get through reselling the 
electricity received on the market (MI), thus changing the 
state budget constraint. The objective functions and con-
straints of the optimization problem for the FIT system 
are given in Table 1.
3.2 Optimal contract design in FIP systems
The basic concept of the FIP systems is that the producer 
sells the electricity on the market so that it also takes 
sales risks beyond the operational risks and therefore the 
information asymmetry between the entrepreneur and the 
financier is influenced by the revenue side. The FIP defini-
tion, like the FIT system, may also differ depending on the 
technology, energy resource, size, location, and may incor-
porate seasonal changes, but they will no longer affect 
the model. FIP systems can be categorized according to 
the logic of premium formation: distinguishing between 
fixed (market-independent) and variable (market-depen-
dent) subsidies (Couture and Gagnon, 2010). The subsec-
tion first implements the benchmark model framework on 
the fixed premium system, then details the reference price 
variable and the proportional variable premium systems.
Fig. 2 In the FIT system, the total revenue is independent of 
the market prices. 
Table 1 Optimization problem for FIT system
Obje
Objective function of 
entrepreneur
max( )SI d CI p R AH H i− − −
ICe
Incentive constraint of 
entrepreneur
R BI p pe H L− − ≥/ ( ) 0
PCi
Participation constraint 
of investor
p R FH i − ≥ 0
BC0 Budget constraint (t = 0) A F I+ − ≥ 0
BC1 Budget constraint (t = 1) SI d CI R RH e i− − − ≥ 0
PCS
Participation constraint 
of state EI MI SI+ − ≥ 0
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3.2.1 Fix FIP
The essence of fix premium pricing is that the producer 
receives a market independent, predetermined premium, 
after its sales on the market. In this case the level of the 
subsidy is constant over the period, but the producer can 
achieve higher revenues, if he or she maximizes the vol-
ume and selling price of his sales (Fig. 3).
In the fixed premium system, the level of support 
remains unchanged by the entrepreneur's behavior, 
but sales revenue and operating costs can be changed. 
Thus, the relevance of the moral hazard assumption is:
p MI d CI EI I p MI d CI EI BI I
p M d C E p M d C E B
H H L L
H H L L
− + − > > − + + −
− + > > − + +
0
1 .
 
(16)
In the optimization problem, sales revenues will be 
risky, so the objective functions will change. The gener-
ated energy is sold by the entrepreneur so the state's bud-
get constraint extends only to the externalities of the proj-
ect (as in the benchmark model) (Table 2).
3.2.2 Variable FIP with market reference price 
("floating premium")
While in the fixed FIP system, the entrepreneur received the 
same amount of support per unit of generated electricity, in 
variable premium pricing the premium rate is the difference 
between a fixed maximum subsidy ceiling and a reference 
price. As the reference price changes, the premium rate is 
also altered. A reference price can be the company's sales 
price or some other virtual price (for example, the average 
price for a fixed period of time for one of the products of the 
electricity market) (Couture and Gagnon, 2010). If the refer-
ence pricing is based on the sales of the company – without 
setting a cap and floor limit for prices – the producer will 
not be interested in maximizing its sales price in the support 
band and will converge towards the FIT from the perspective 
of the contractual terms. If the reference price is determined 
on a market basis (with the formation of a common virtual 
reference price) the producer will be motivated to maximize 
the sales price because the deviation (θ) from the market ref-
erence appears as a surplus or a cost (Fig. 4). Moreover, the 
operation of the system will be cheaper for the state as no 
separate reference price is required for each company.
We assume that the gap will be positive (0 ≤ θ), so if 
the entrepreneur exerts a lot of effort, he or she can sell 
electricity over the market price, if the effort is low, then 
at worst the entrepreneur sells it at the electricity market 
(on the reference price). As the entrepreneur can obtain 
potential surplus income from the market, the private 
utility can be increased by not inducing state overpay-
ments. In order to take into account the expected value of 
the sales gap (θ) in the social welfare, the revenue of the 
project should be corrected by the probabilities pH and pL. 
The relevance of the moral hazard assumption in variable 
FIP with market reference price is:
MI p I d CI EI I
MI p I d CI EI BI I
M p d C E M p
H H
L L
H H L
+ − + − >
> + − + + −
+ − + > > +
θ
θ
θ
0
1 θ − + +d C E BL .
 (17)
In this model, besides the objective functions, the 
entrepreneur's incentive constraint also changes because 
the θ will reduce the agency costs. The assumption of this 
model framework is that the state is able to forecast and 
price the externalities and therefore does not handle the 
public risk while the level of subsidy varies. The market 
reference price variable FIP contract design optimization 
problem is shown in Table 3.
Fig. 3 In the fix FIP system, the subsidy is independent of 
the market prices. 
Table 2 Optimization problem for fix FIP system
Obje
Objective function of 
entrepreneur
max( )SI p MI d CI p R AH H H i+ − − −
ICe
Incentive constraint of 
entrepreneur
R BI p pe H L− − ≥/ ( ) 0
PCi
Participation constraint 
of investor
p R FH i − ≥ 0
BC0 Budget constraint (t = 0) A F I+ − ≥ 0
BC1 Budget constraint (t = 1) SI MI d CI R RH e i+ − − − ≥ 0
PCS
Participation constraint 
of state EI SI− ≥ 0
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3.2.3 Variable FIP with multiplier pricing
In the case of multiplier pricing, the producer receives 
percentage of the sales price as a subsidy (SI = αMI). 
Overall, the disadvantage of this system is that it is diffi-
cult for the state to determine the volume of subsidies, but 
the advantage is that it rewards those participants who are 
more capable of selling their electricity, thus greatly con-
tributing to the selection of producers and the integration 
of renewable technologies into the market (Fig. 5).
In multiplicative pricing, the entrepreneur's behav-
ior affects everything (support, sales, costs), so he or she 
will be more motivated in this system to perform well and 
thereby increase profit. The new relevance of the moral 
hazard assumption is:
p MI d CI EI I p MI d CI EI BI I
p M d C E p M d C E B
H H L L
H H L L
− + − > > − + + −
− + > > − + +
0
1 .
 
(18)
In the optimization problem the subsidy will reduce 
agency costs and, as before, the objective functions and 
the budget constraint of t = 1 will be modified (Table 4).
The regulators often use caps and floors in the FIP sys-
tems. The purpose of these is to ensure, that subsidies do 
not increase drastically or if negative prices prevail, regu-
lators will not pay for the subsidies. These boundaries can 
be modelled as a combination of the former systems, so 
the article does not deal with them in detail.
4 Results
The parameters that can be generated by solving the 
optimization problems are summarized in Table 5 and 
Table 6. The systems can be compared based on the 
size of investment (I) and social welfare (W). We define 
pledgeable income ρ0: the maximum expected income per 
unit of investment that the investor can provide without 
violating the incentives.
The social welfare of FIT and fix FIP can be described 
as Eq. (19) and Eq. (20):
W A M d C E
p E M d C B
p p
H
H H
H L
= − + −
− + − −
−


















( )
/
1
1
 (19)
Fig. 4 In the floating premium system, additional sales profit can be 
achieved by increasing sales prices. 
Table 3 Optimization problem for variable FIP system with market 
reference price
Obje
Objective function of 
entrepreneur
max( )SI MI d CI p I p R AH H H i+ − + − −θ
ICe
Incentive constraint 
of entrepreneur
R BI p p Ie H L− − + ≥/ ( ) θ 0
PCi
Participation 
constraint of investor
p R FH i − ≥ 0
BC0
Budget constraint 
(t = 0) A F I+ − ≥ 0
BC1
Budget constraint 
(t = 1)
SI MI d CI R RH e i+ − − − ≥ 0
PCS
Participation 
constraint of state EI SI− ≥ 0
Table 4 Optimization problem for variable FIP system with 
multiplier pricing
Obje
Objective function of 
entrepreneur
max( ( ) )p MI d CI p R AH H H i1+ − − −α
ICe
Incentive constraint of 
entrepreneur
R BI p pe H L− − + ≥/ (( )( ))1 0α
PCi
Participation constraint 
of investor
p R FH i − ≥ 0
BC0 Budget constraint (t = 0) A F I+ − ≥ 0
BC1 Budget constraint (t = 1) MI d CI R RH e i( )1 0+ − − − ≥α
PCS
Participation constraint 
of state EI MI− ≥α 0
Fig. 5 In the multiplicative pricing system, the subsidy is a percentage 
of the sales price. 
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W A p M d C E
p E M d C B
p p
H H
H H
H L
= − + −
− + − −
−




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The social welfare of variable FIP with virtual and mul-
tiplier pricing can be described as Eq. (21) and Eq. (22):
W A p M p d C E
p E M d C B
p p
H H H
H H
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= + − + −
− + + − −
−


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
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
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
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 (22)
The incentive constraint does not change in the FIT 
and fix FIP systems as compared to the benchmark model 
because these subsidies do not induce excessive motiva-
tion for entrepreneurs to do higher efforts. By contrast, 
the floating and multiplicative premium systems will facil-
itate the entrepreneur to encourage higher sales prices to 
increase his own payments. The amount of the subsidy is 
influenced by the sales that the investor can except, so the 
agency cost will be reduced.
The results clearly show that the smallest size of invest-
ment (and lowest pledgeable income) will be in the fix FIP 
system because the entrepreneur and the investor do not get 
compensation through by the subsidy system for the higher 
sales prices compared to the other models (if the state is able 
Table 5 Results for decision parameters (FIT and Fix FIP)
Parameter FIT Fix FIP
Size of investment
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−
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Table 6 Results for decision parameters (Variable FIP with virtual and multiplier pricing)
Parameter Variable FIP with virtual price Variable FIP with multiplier pricing
Size of investment
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to sell electricity as efficiently as the contractor, the FIT and 
the fixed FIP have the same results). The most important 
achievement is that – even though the FIT subsidy is most 
secure from an investor point of view – the variable FIP with 
virtual price will be better than the FIT, because the entre-
preneur becomes more motivated to maximize sales reve-
nue, thus reducing agency costs, financing becomes more 
efficient, and size of investment increases, improving social 
welfare. The model also shows that this type of subsidy is 
well suited to the European Union's aspirations to integrate 
RES on the market, as investors will be interested in increas-
ing θ, and this can be achieved by better forecasting, operat-
ing smart systems, and portfolio optimization, all of which 
will help to drive renewables into the market.
Whether multiplier pricing will be better than FIT or 
variable FIP depends on the parameter α. Following ear-
lier assumptions the system does not affect the amount of 
subsidy paid (it is influenced by the externality), resulting 
in the following:
α = + −( ) / ( ) .S M p MH 1  (23)
As multiplier pricing increases sales motivation and 
reduces agency costs, this will also perform better than 
FIT. In the case of the determined value of the subsidy, 
the effectiveness of the motivation will decide, which pre-
mium system is the better: the extra profit available at a 
virtual price or the motivation for potential increase in sub-
sidy. In reality there will be a margin at which the virtual 
price premium will be more favorable, but above certain 
volatility, multiplicative pricing will be more motivating.
5 Conclusion
The purpose of this article was to compare state support 
mechanisms for renewable electricity generation in terms 
of the level of information asymmetry that is emerging. 
The methodology used follows a well-known contract 
theoretical base model (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997) 
and the extension of the state subsidy model (Berlinger 
et al., 2017), while partly retaining their assumptions. 
This paper looked at the behavior of three actors (an entre-
preneur, an investor and the state) and described a model 
that shows how actors share the generated goods. It is 
important to clarify that the purpose of the article was not 
to clearly state that one of the subsidy schemes is generally 
superior than the other. The purpose of the model was to 
point out a factor that can be a single dimension of deci-
sion-makers' reflection and help actors better understand 
market processes to determine the ideal support system. 
The two most important assumptions used in this article 
was that the state is able to price accurately the externali-
ties of the investment and pay it exactly as a subsidy, and 
the behavior of the entrepreneur can influence the oper-
ating costs and the sales revenue. If the motivation of the 
entrepreneur approaches the investor's motivation, the 
income that can be distributed between them will increase.
According to the built model, if the state is equally capa-
ble of selling electricity as a contractor and paying all these 
as subsidy, the feed-in tariff system and the fixed feed-in pre-
mium system are equivalent. However, if the support system 
adds an additional motivator that encourages the entrepre-
neur to sell better than other market participants, it reduces 
agency costs and thus increases the income of the entrepre-
neur and the investor. In the premium system, several pric-
ing methods are suitable for introducing such motivations, 
this article dealt with floating, virtual premium pricing and 
multiplicative premium. In the model framework, both pre-
mium pricings decrease the agency costs and thus increase 
the private and social benefits of the projects.
The most important conclusion of this article is that 
support systems which provide less protection to the entre-
preneur improve the efficiency of project funding through 
increased motivation. This generally contradicts the view 
that aid schemes offering more market protection are bet-
ter for investors and points out that a reduction in market 
protection can be offset by increasing motivation, result-
ing in a reduction of agency costs.
To make the model presented in this paper more useful in 
energy policy decisions, it may be worthwhile to extend it 
to more criterions. The most important extension can be the 
presentation of different moral hazards that can be assigned 
to the different cost structures of renewable technologies. 
In cases where the hard-to-control operating costs are 
higher, the agency costs will be higher. A potential further 
development is a more detailed examination of the role of the 
state, which can be done on several levels. On one hand, the 
level of subsidies may be further sophisticated: taking into 
account that investments are subject to conditional (depend-
ing on the success of the investment) and unconditional 
(shown in the model) externalities. On the other hand, it may 
be worth testing the hypothesis that the support levels are the 
same because the state takes on a different risk in each sub-
sidy system and this is affected by the tendering procedure 
for the support levels. An exciting addition could be that 
while projects compete for state subsidies, the state needs 
the timely completion of investments to reach its renewable 
energy commitments, but when the grant is awarded, the 
state has less information about the entrepreneur and this 
can lead to an adverse selection problem.
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Mariann Szabó, Tamás Szőke, Szabolcs Vágvölgyi, Ákos 
Varga for their useful and constructive recommendations 
on this project.
Hortay
Period. Polytech. Soc. Man. Sci., 27(1), pp. 37–47, 2019|47
Kleer, R. (2010) "Government R&D subsidies as a signal for private 
investors", Research Policy, 39(10), pp. 1361–1374.
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2010.08.001
Klein, A., Pfluger, B., Held, A, Ragwitz, M., Resch, G., Faber, T. 
(2008) "Evaluation of different feed-in tariff design options ‒ 
Best practice paper for the International Feed-In Cooperation", 
[pdf] Energy Economics Group, Fraunhofer Institute Systems 
and Innovation Research, Available at: file:///C:/Users/user/
Downloads/best_practice_paper_2nd_edition_final%20(1).pdf 
[Accessed: 15 August 2018]
Laffont, J.-J., Tirole, J. (1988) "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts", 
Econometrica, 56(5), pp. 1153–1175.
 https://doi.org/10.2307/1911362
Lipp, J. (2007) "Lessons for effective renewable electricity policy from 
Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom", Energy Policy, 
35(11), pp. 5481–5495.
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2007.05.015
Mankiw, N. G. (2004) "Principles of Economics", 3rd ed., South-Western 
College Publishing, Nashville, USA.
Mendonça, M. (2007) "Feed-in Tariffs: Accelerating the Deployment of 
Renewable Energy", 1st ed., Routledge, London, UK.
 https://doi.org/10.4324/9781849771313
Nicolini, M., Tavoni, M. (2017) "Are renewable energy subsidies effec-
tive? Evidence from Europe", Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
Reviews, 74, pp. 412–423.
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2016.12.032
Sappington, D. (1983) "Limited liability contracts between principal and 
agent", Journal of Economic Theory, 29(1), pp. 1–21.
 https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90120-5
Schertler, A. (2000) "The Impact of Public Subsidies on Venture Capital 
Investments in Start-Up Enterprises", Kiel Institute for the World 
Economics, Kiel, Germany, Kiel Working Paper No. 1018.
Schertler, A. (2002a) "Comparative Advantages of Public Loan and Public 
Equity Schemes in Venture Capital Markets", Kiel Institute for the 
World Economics, Kiel, Germany, Kiel Working Paper No. 1118.
Schertler, A. (2002b) "Venture Capitalists Investment Incentives Under 
Public Equity Schemes", Kiel Institute for the World Economics, 
Kiel, Germany, Kiel Working Paper No. 1117.
Shavell, S. (1979) "Risk sharing and incentives in the principal and agent 
relationship", The Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), pp. 55–73.
 https://doi.org/10.2307/3003319
Stern, N. S. S. (2006) "The Economics of Climate Change", 1st ed., 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
Takalo, T., Tanayama, T. (2010) "Adverse selection and financing of 
innovation: is there need for R&D subsidies?", The Journal of 
Technology Transfer, 35(1), pp. 16–41.
 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10961-009-9112-8
Tirole, J. (2006) "The Theory of Corporate Finance", 1st ed., Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, USA.
Verbruggen, A., Lauber, V. (2012) "Assessing the performance of 
renewable electricity support instruments", Energy Policy, 45, 
pp. 635–644.
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.03.014
